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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS: CONTRACTS IN PERPETUUM 
In 1905 the newly organized University of Florida was look-
ing for a home. By statute1 the Board of Control was empower-
ed to choose the site, and in so choosing, to take donations of-
fered by municipalities wishing to be chosen. Through its "Cit-
izen's Committee" (an unofficial body with no real authority) 
the City of Gainesville, Florida, offered, in addition to substan-
tial donations of buildings and lands, to furnish water to the 
University free of charge. The offer was accepted; the Uni-
versity of Florida, with an enrollment of 135 students, set up 
blackboards in Gainesville (population 3,633) ;2 and water began 
flowing through University pipes. 
The instant case3 was brought by the City of Gainesville, pray-
ing for a declaration of rights under the contract. In the interim 
between the "donation" and the suit, enrollment of the University 
had increased to 11,000 students.4 The City (population 26,861)1> 
alleged it had floated revenue bonds for its present waterworks, 
the revenue from the waterworks was insufficient to retire the 
bonds, new facilities were needed, but new bonds could not be 
sold under the present situation. 
The City's contentions were: (1) the "Citizen's Committee" 
had no authority to make the contract, and the contract, "ultra 
vires" in its inception, could not be ratified by subsequent ac-
tions of the City; (2) the term of the contract being indefinite, 
it was (a) void as against public policy as being "perpetual," or 
(b) if construed as being for a "reasonable time," the "reasonable 
time" had expired sometime during the past forty-five years; 
!!G Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
1 Fla. Acts c. 538 (1905). 
2 1 Census of Population: 1950, 10-8. 
3 Gainesville v. Board of Control of Florida, 81 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1955). 
4 Id. at 516. 
G 1 Census of Population: 1950, 10-8. 
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and (3) the present size of the University was not contemplated 
at the time the contract was made, and, as the contract places 
an uncontemplated burden upon the City of considerable magni-
tude, the City should be relieved from the conti·act. 
Held: Affirmed, the contract is enforceable. Assuming the 
"Citizen's Committee" lacked the power to make the donation, 
such a donation was within the proprietary power of the City, 
and had been ratified by forty-five years of free water. Regard-
ing the term of the contract, it is clear from the statute6 that the 
City could, and did, contract for a term, not "perpetual" or "for-
ever," but for "so long as the University remains in Gainesville."7 
As to the size of the University, and the burden upon the City, 
the court reasoned that the larger the University, the more bus-
iness and money accrued to the City. 
May a municipal contract last forever? There is some au-
thority for the proposition that the municipality, if properly au-
thorized by statute, may make a "perpetual" contract. 8 
Was Gainesville authorized to make such a contract? The 
statute was by no means explicit that Gainesville could so contract. 
In fact, the statute said nothing on this point.9 Nor did the city 
charter. The court reasoned from the fact that (1) the Board 
o Fla . .Acts c. 538 (1905). 
1 "We take judicial notice of the location as permanent, but we do 
not indulge the clairvoyance that it will be perpetual. Herculaneum and 
Pompeii were permanent but history records that they were not per-
petual. 
We do not dare or wish to anticipate or apprehend that misfortune 
or disaster will overtake either the University of Florida or the City of 
Gainesville or that circumstances will bring about removal of the in-
stitution from its present site, but we do say that the physical situation 
is not so inexorably fixed that the contract can be condemned as one to 
last forever." Gainesville v. Board of Control of Florida, 81 So. 2d 514, 
518 (Fla. 1955). 
s 10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 29.102 (3d ed. 1949); Borough 
of Milltown v. City of New Brunswick, 138 N.J. Eq. 552, 49 .A.2d 234 
(1946); Borough of Milltown v. City of New Brunswick, 46 .A.2d 562 
(N.J. 1946); City of New Brunswick v. Borough of Milltown, 135 N.J. 
Eq. 310, 38 .A.2d 288 ( 1944). .All three cases involved a contract be-
tween the Borough and the Town whereby the Town agreed to dispose of 
the Borough's sewage. It was held in these cases that, as the statute 
delegating to cities the power to contract contained no limitations as to 
the length of time the contract might run, the contract was valid, al-
though, by its terms, it might be perpetual. Des Moines v. West Des 
Moines, 239 Iowa 1, 30 N.W.2d 500 (1948), holding a similar sewage 
contract between two cities valid although, by its language, capable of 
being perpetual in operation. 
9 Fla. Rev. Stat. § 325 (1892). 
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of Control was given power to "receive donations," and (2) an-
other statute10 authorized the city of Tallahassee to guarantee to 
the Board the payment of $2,000 per year "forever," to the con-
clusion that although Gainesville confessedly lacked express 
power, it was clothed with the implied power to make an (al-
most) perpetual, donation-type contract. 
Should such a power be implied? 
As a legal matter, there is considerable authority for the 
proposition that the giving of water, free of charge, is a legis-
lative or governmental function of the city, and that a contract 
whereby the city agrees to furnish water for an indefinite fu-
ture time, or forever, is invalid as binding the legislative power 
of subsequent councils.11 And as a practical matter this con-
tract, while not "perpetual," will bind the City for a long, long 
time. 
10 Gainesville v. Board of Control of Florida, 81 So. 2d 514, 517 (Fla. 
1955). 
11 City Council of Augusta Y. Richmond County, 178 Ga. 400, 173 S.E. 
140 (1934) (a contract whereby a municipality agreed to furnish water 
for a courthouse and jail deeded by the municipality to the county was 
ultra vires and not enforceable against subsequent councils); cf. Screws 
v. City of Atlanta, 189 Ga. 839, 8 S.E.2d 16 (1940) (the power to fix 
water rates is a governmental power, and a contract whereby the Council 
agreed to furnish free water to the lessee of municipally owned fair-
grounds for a period of twenty-five years was ultra vires and not binding 
upon subsequent councils); Horkan v. Moultrie, 136 Ga. 561, 71 S.E. 
785 (1911) (a city cannot contract to furnish free water to a private 
person for an indefinite period even where consideration for the contract 
is a sewer right-of-way over lands owned by the person, as power to 
fix water rates is governmental in character and cannot be bargained 
away, nor can contract be ratified, or city estopped to assert its invalidity); 
Trustees of the Illinois Hospital for the Insane v. Jacksonville, 61 Ill. 
• .\pp. 199 (1895) (a contract by the city to furnish water to the hos-
pital at a fixed rate for ten years is not enforceable against the city be-
cause the power to , fix rates for water is a governmental function, and 
one council cannot bind its successors with regard to legislative powers); 
and see Commonwealth ex rel. Fortney v. Bartol, 342 Pa. 172, 20 A.2d 
313 (1941) (holding a contract whereby the City agreed to make an an-
nual appropriation of $3,000 to a Volunteer Fire Department invalid); 
Robbins v. Boulder County, 50 Colo. 610, 115 Pac. 526 (19.10) (the power 
to expend the County's money for future years being a governmental 
function, the County could not accept a bequest of $50,000 from a Colo-
rado decedent on condition that it agree to maintain a hospital for or-
phans and "old widow ladies" which was to be built with the $50,000); 
State v. :Minnesota Transfer Ry., 80 Minn. 108, 83 N.W. 32 (1900) (an 
agreement by a municipality to maintain forever a railroad bridge to be 
built jointly by the railroad and the city was invalid); 10 McQuillin, 
:Municipal Corporations §§ 29.101, 29.102 (3d ed. 1949). 
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But it was on the basis of practical considerations that the 
implied power was read into the statute. By the decision an im-
possible "reasonable time" question was avoided; similar suits 
1·egarding donations were discouraged; and the State budget was 
not confused.12 And thus the drain on the Gainesville water-
works, and the City budget, was confirmed in perpetuity {al-
most). 
William H. Sherwood, '56 
12 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 282.01, item 62, footnote (1953), as cited by the 
court: "*Provided that none of these monies shall be used to purchase 
water from the City of Gainesville.'' Gainesville v. Board of Control of 
Florida, 81 So.2d 514, 517 (Fla. 1955). 
